Chapter 1: Understanding Metaphysics

Metaphysics has often been questioned: is it still necessary? Reflect on this critical quote, which encapsulates a significant perspective in philosophy:

"All objects of human reason or inquiry can be divided into two types: relations of ideas and matters of fact. The former includes the sciences like Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic, which are discerned solely through thought. Matters of fact, the second type, are not discovered in the same way; our evidence for their truth, no matter how substantial, is fundamentally different. Therefore, if we examine any work of theology or metaphysics, we must ask: Does it present any abstract reasoning related to quantity or number? No. Does it provide experimental reasoning regarding existence? No. Then, it deserves to be disregarded, as it likely offers only sophistry and illusion." (David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section IV part I)

I have had a complex relationship with this quote. The first time I encountered it during my philosophical studies, I felt an epiphany: YES! Away with metaphysics! However, years later, I realized that applying Hume's Fork to his own work would imply that it lacks both relations of ideas (i.e., mathematics, formal logic) and matters of fact (i.e., empirical science). Yet, it remains a cornerstone of early modern philosophy.

Now, I find myself reconsidering once more. It seems that Hume's Fork isn't universally applicable. For instance, it doesn't fit literary criticism, nor does it pertain to philosophy when it critically evaluates various concepts—an approach I believe modern philosophy should predominantly adopt. (The significant exception being philosophy as a way of life, which stands as another valid philosophical form.)

Section 1.1: The Verification Principle

I have also grappled with a related idea introduced by the logical positivists at the dawn of the 20th century: the verification principle. This principle asserts that only statements which can be empirically verified hold meaning, with logical truths as the sole exception. Notably, this principle echoes Hume's Fork.

The logical positivists themselves acknowledged limitations to their principle, preempting many criticisms. They excluded theology, metaphysics (the same domains Hume critiqued), and fields like aesthetics and ethics. Their claim wasn't that such statements are literally meaningless (a poorly chosen phrase), but rather that they fail to convey truth values or factual information. From my perspective, this distinction is valid.

A common, albeit simplistic, critique of the verification principle is that it fails to apply to itself. While true, this criticism overlooks the essence of logical positivism as a critical stance on epistemology rather than a vehicle for establishing truths, whether mathematical or empirical.

Nonetheless, decades after the decline of logical positivism (and its derivative, logical empiricism), we can learn from thinkers like James Ladyman and Don Ross in Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. In the section titled "Neo-Positivism," they assert:

"Embracing naturalism in metaphysics equates to adopting a verificationist perspective towards both science and metaphysics."

In other words, both science and metaphysics assert truth-like claims about the world, and our response should be to request evidence.

Importantly, Ladyman and Ross's version of verificationism shifts the focus from the meaning of statements to their epistemic value. A neo-positivist, or neo-Humean, does not contend that metaphysical claims are meaningless; rather, they lack epistemic substance. This insufficiency renders them ineffective and suggests that we should set aside metaphysical inquiries.

Subsection 1.1.1: The Case of Philosophical Zombies

Consider the much-discussed "philosophical zombies" introduced by David Chalmers in the philosophy of mind and the metaphysics of consciousness. These hypothetical beings, or p-zombies, are physically identical to us but exist in non-conscious states. Chalmers does not claim they exist or could exist within our physical universe governed by its laws; he merely states that they are conceivable in some possible universe.

From this modest premise, he launches an extensive critique of physicalism in the philosophy of mind, famously asserting that science will never resolve the "hard" problem of consciousness and that we must accept mental properties as fundamentally different from physical properties (the basis for property dualism).

This argument raises significant questions: Is it rational to draw such conclusions from mere thought experiments based on conceivability? Given the vagueness of the concept of conceivability, none of Chalmers's assertions are empirically verifiable, nor are they derived from mathematical or formal logical relations. Therefore, are they nonsense as the logical empiricists suggested? Not quite, as I can comprehend what Chalmers posits. Should his works be disregarded entirely, as Hume advised? I firmly oppose book-burning in any form.

However, Chalmers should not be taken seriously when he attempts to articulate how reality operates without engaging with our only means of accessing that reality: empirical evidence. His speculations, aptly described by theoretical physicist Wolfgang Pauli as "not even wrong," lack substantive grounding.

Why doesn't this objection apply to Ladyman and Ross's own criterion of epistemic verifiability? Because they are not making factual claims about reality; they engage in philosophical discourse akin to literary criticism, where demanding empirical or mathematical-logical proof would be illogical.

Chapter 2: The Future of Metaphysics

In the first video, "Can Metaphysics Discern God I? | Episode 1704 | Closer To Truth," the discussion revolves around the relevance of metaphysics in understanding divinity, further illuminating the tension between empirical evidence and metaphysical claims.

The second video, "What is Metaphysics? (Crash Course) - Contemplate This - Dr. Michelle Medrano - Episode 12 - [ CSL ]" provides a comprehensive overview of metaphysics, contextualizing its role in philosophical inquiry and its evolution over time.

So, what is the future of metaphysics? Should we abandon it entirely? Not necessarily. I propose that metaphysics is at a juncture where it can be "dissolved" into various natural sciences. Just as natural philosophy gradually evolved into distinct scientific disciplines like physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, we can observe a similar trend today.

Specifically, I believe that metaphysics as a broad discipline can now merge with science (in its broadest sense) and the critical field of philosophy of science. Philosophy of mind is increasingly converging with neuroscience, cognitive science, and potentially evolutionary biology. Ontology, which examines existence, is now aligned with fundamental physics, among other examples.

This process of dissolution implies that metaphysical questions and issues either fall into the category Chalmers explores—those that are "not even wrong"—or they align with the critical analysis that Ladyman and Ross advocate in Every Thing Must Go. The answers to these questions emerge from a philosophical critique of what physics, biology, and cognitive science reveal.

Of course, there will always be questions that could potentially yield empirical answers but are unlikely to be resolved. The origins of life and the universe are prime examples. If we cannot answer these queries, it may be due to our cognitive limitations or the absence of historical traces that could provide empirical clues.

My previous discussion might be perceived as a straightforward endorsement of scientism—a notion that only scientifically answerable questions are meaningful. However, I do not subscribe to this view, as evidenced by my writings. Scientism implies that only scientifically resolvable inquiries are worth pursuing, which I do not believe to be true.

This essay exemplifies this point. Just as Hume's Enquiry lacked both relations of ideas and matters of fact, the text you are reading does not rest on empirically verifiable statements. This is not problematic, as I am engaging in philosophical critique rather than asserting factual truths about the world.

Consequently, there remains substantial work for philosophers to undertake. Philosophy did not vanish after the Scientific Revolution, even though natural philosophy transformed into distinct scientific disciplines.

Moreover, each time a branch of philosophy transitions into a scientific discipline, it generates new philosophical inquiries, leading to fields like the philosophy of biology, philosophy of physics, philosophy of language, and so on. For a deeper exploration of how philosophy progresses, refer to my further writings.

It should be evident that this perspective is not special pleading. To provide one more example, I assert that ethics remains a valid field of philosophical inquiry and is not at risk of being absorbed into biology or sociology. Ethics involves critical reasoning about actions in various circumstances based on the values we hold.

Ethical decision-making should certainly consider empirical evidence, as it pertains to real-life situations. Additionally, one could argue that science offers empirical explanations for the origins (via evolutionary biology) and mechanisms (through neuroscience) of ethical instincts and reasoning.

Nevertheless, ethical decision-making does not revolve around moral truths (I am not an ethical realist). If it did, we would face the same question posed to metaphysicians: how do you know? Rather, ethics concerns what logically follows from our values and the facts at hand. Thus, ethics constitutes a form of (philosophical) discourse that does not conflict with the epistemic verificationism proposed by Ladyman and Ross.

Given all this, we can adapt Hume's fork as follows:

If we examine any volume (or video, or podcast) on metaphysics, we must ask: (i) Does it contain formal logical or mathematical reasoning? No. (ii) Does it provide empirically based reasoning about facts and existence? No. (iii) Does it confine itself to critical philosophy? No. We should then set it aside (but refrain from burning it!), as it likely contains nothing but sophistry and illusion.